



# Skin *in the* game

Jeffery E. Marshall

Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining  
Global Security and Stability



**Cover:** Multinational color guard lines up for Multinational Division Central South change of command ceremony, July 2006.  
Photo courtesy of U.S. Air Force/Adrian Cadiz.

# Skin *in the* game

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
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Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining  
Global Security and Stability

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**Preface by** Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN



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“ Around the world, even as we pursue a new era of engagement with other nations, we’re embracing a broader engagement—new partnerships between societies and citizens, community organizations, business, faith-based groups. . . . In fact, this spirit of partnership is a defining feature of our foreign policy. ”

*—President Barack Obama, September 22, 2009*

# Preface

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We operate in a complex and dynamic security environment. Planning assumptions that held for decades are no longer relevant; assumptions that are relevant today may not be next year. Asymmetric threats are exploding, and the level of complexity and the challenges that we face will only continue to grow. The United States simply cannot meet every challenge unilaterally. Resources are only part of the problem. Even if we had unlimited resources, we would still need the perspectives and skills that our partners can bring to bear to address increasingly complex issues.

Deep, enduring partnerships based on shared values, mutual benefit, and trust are vital to maintain our security. Our partners bring critical capabilities that we often cannot duplicate. They also bring a multilateral approach to security that is increasingly important for economic, cultural, and political reasons. While the United States will maintain its role as the preeminent global power for the foreseeable future, the growth of China and other regional powers, as well as the appearance of new economic powers such as India, will make it difficult for any country to consistently act unilaterally. More to the point, however, multilateral action is in the Nation's best interests. As a global political, economic, and cultural power, U.S. prosperity is increasingly linked to global prosperity and strong partnerships.

While we recognize the need for partnerships and say they are vital to securing our interests, the truth is that our partnership-building methods are locked into Cold War–era systems, processes, and policies. While these systems served us well at the time, they do not support the requirements in today's complex environment.

For example, the Army's training facilities in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, are state-of-the-art facilities. They were built when the Army had two corps in Germany in order to provide training similar to that offered to troops at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. With the end of the Cold War, the United States moved many of these troops back to the continental United States (CONUS). However, the facilities remain vital to our efforts in Europe. They now form the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) and are critical to our partnership-building and partner training efforts. Yet the resourcing models we use still reflect only the Army's usage and training requirements. As more forces may move back to CONUS, the Army resourcing models show a need for the facilities, and the Army is considering closing them. Yet as our troop footprint shrinks, JMTC's importance grows. It is an important visible sign of our presence in Europe and of our continued commitment to our allies and partners. Our resourcing models and systems must change to reflect the requirements of the new environment in which we operate.

There are similar examples throughout our planning and resourcing systems from the Guidance for the Employment of the Forces through the synchronization of Department of State and Department of Defense programs and resources at the partner country level. We need to take a holistic look at these systems and ensure they meet the requirements of our new environment.

The following book takes this approach. It provides a detailed analysis of what we need to do to effectively build and sustain enduring partnerships, examines our current state, and offers a roadmap with specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and employ a holistic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often miss are that our partners have a say in the process and that we need to manage the process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/

reinvestment decisions based upon capability objectives that we and our partners agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to achieve them.

In the end, as we always say at U.S. European Command, we are indeed “Stronger Together.”

—ADM James G. Stavridis, USN  
Commander, U.S. European Command  
Supreme Allied Commander Europe



# Executive Summary

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We must recognize building partner capability and capacity as a critical, distinct line of effort that contributes greatly to U.S., partner, regional, and global security. Global stability and security are core foundational requirements for all U.S. vital interests. However, the Nation cannot maintain global security and stability by itself. Given the size of the globe, the multiplicity of cultures and interests, and the sheer cost of maintaining stability and security, the United States must work with other countries that have the common goals of security and stability and will share the costs and burdens of maintaining them. Moreover, the process of burden sharing actually helps to promote greater stability and security, as more countries are invested in the outcome, or have “skin in the game.”

At the same time, we must understand that building partner capability is a team sport. Relationships matter. They must be built, sustained, and nourished, or they will not work. Both the United States/coalition and the partner need to benefit from the relationship. Open, honest dialogue about requirements, capacity, and national will is vital to success.

Partner capability-building is not new. Since its inception, the United States has been involved in the process as either a client or a builder. Arguably, the French and the Dutch engaged in building partner capabilities during the American Revolutionary War. Both governments provided financing, training, and equipment to help the Americans defeat the British. The Lend-Lease program and others were capability-building programs during World War II. Other capability began at least as early as the John F. Kennedy administration with the birth of the Special Forces, whose primary mission is to build partner capability.

In some ways, the linkage between partner capability-building and special operations forces (SOF) is unfortunate. Today, many U.S. partner capability-building efforts are included in irregular warfare resourcing programs. However, most current U.S. programs are conducted not by SOF, but rather by conventional forces. When we include partner capability-building and SOF in the same resourcing program, we do a disservice to both types of operations. Building partner capability and special operations are two distinct lines of operations that may overlap at times, but one is not a subset of the other.

Currently, U.S. partner capability- and capacity-building is inefficient. There are too many authorities, funding mechanisms often are too inflexible, and planning and execution are fragmented. We need to streamline this process and make it much more effective and responsive if we want to rapidly adapt to changing situations and requirements. We also need to establish capability organizations that can effectively work with our partners, develop clear, concise plans, and successfully implement them in a timely manner.

The logical place for such organizations is at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) level. These organizations will need to tie into capability- and capacity-building activities within other agencies and coordinate their activities to ensure they are harmonized and synchronized. The GCC also is the natural integrator for all country plans since the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in each country in a theater reports to the GCC.

Global stability and security are core foundational requirements for all U.S. vital interests. With a stable and secure global environment, threats against the homeland are reduced, and the United States has far better access to global trade. However, security and stability do not provide these benefits in and of themselves. There could still be obstacles to trade and governments that block free trade. There could still be

hostile nations that seek to undermine U.S. security. But stability and security provide the foundation for better commerce, freedom of navigation, and security from attacks against the homeland—conditions necessary for U.S. prosperity and our way of life.

Several countries have the capacity to promote global security and stability with little or no direct U.S. assistance. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have well-developed military capabilities and strong economies that can support a broad spectrum of global engagement. Other countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have proven their desire to contribute to global stability and security in a variety of ways within the scope of their capacity to sustain these efforts. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria have consistently shown the desire to contribute and are working to develop improved and interoperable capabilities, but they require assistance. Still other countries clearly have niche capabilities that, if properly grown and nurtured, can contribute to an overall framework.

Many potential partners, however, do not have the capability to contribute to regional, let alone global, stability and security. They might lack the resources to develop capabilities from scratch, have the resources but not the technical expertise, or lack the infrastructure and processes to develop and sustain capabilities. If the United States and other well-developed countries want these potential partners to participate in global security, they will need to invest in them to develop their capabilities and capacity. If done properly, the returns on this investment will be large as these countries both increase the security and stability within their own regions and become increasingly capable of exporting security and stability to other regions.

While the United States recognizes the need to develop partnership capability, we still have not developed the systems, policies, and processes required to manage the program effectively. The Guidance for the

Employment of the Force (GEF) recognizes this paradigm shift but the Department of Defense (DOD) is still developing the processes and tools needed to implement these concepts. In addition, the GEF does not properly recognize or prioritize the resources required. While DOD and the Department of State (DOS) recognize the importance of building partner capability and have budgeted considerable funds for it, their efforts are hindered by suboptimal and obsolete processes, budgeting, authorities, and organizational structures. We still have not recognized that we need to change how we do business if we are going to engage our partners effectively and work with them to build capacity.

Our business practices must be standardized across all agencies and headquarters involved with partnership building to effectively establish priorities, allocate resources, and manage program execution. DOD and DOS need to develop common business practices and work together far more effectively to ensure synchronization of effort.

To do this, the paper makes the following recommendations:

- Reorganize the Defense Security Cooperation Agency into a joint interagency security cooperation agency
- Implement interagency security cooperation program and portfolio management
- Standardize capability- and capacity-building systems
- Combine phase zero and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) into a seamless approach to SSTR.





# Capability-building

## The Theory

Our partners need to participate in developing partnership capacity. Partner nations that want U.S. investment to develop their capabilities need to work in conjunction with U.S. partner-building teams to determine which capabilities to build and which institutional systems and support structures are required to support them. There may also be a significant role for collective security organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in capacity-building programs.

Jointly, the United States, the partner, and any collective security organizations need to answer several questions before embarking on any capability-building program:

- What capabilities are required?
- Do any countries currently have capability that can be developed?
- What assistance does the partner need to develop the new capability?
- What countries or organizations are able and willing to provide the needed assistance?
- Who has the baseline capacity to create the capability?
- Which countries have the national will to employ the capability?


The resourcing and capacity-building process is just as important. Effective capacity-building requires dedicated resources, purpose-built processes, and the authorities required to employ them.

Strong, sustained, and nourished relationships that are built upon shared values, mutual interest, respect, and trust—not solely on mutual necessity—are key to building partner capacity. Such relationships need

time to flourish and grow, and need commitment to build trust and shared values. The National Guard State Partnership Program is an excellent example of these types of relationships. The states and countries have forged strong bonds that have been tested in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of our partners in the program will not deploy without their state partner.

These strong relationships allow the United States and partner countries to have the dialogue depicted in the top portion of figure 1 and to answer the questions asked above. Since this is a partnership, both the United States/coalition and the partner need to benefit from the relationship. Open, honest dialogue about requirements, capacity, and national will is vital to success.

**Figure 1. Capability-building**




### DETERMINING CAPABILITY OBJECTIVES

The United States clearly does not have the resources to build capacity for its own sake. We must make prudent investments to build the capac-

ity needed to both maintain security and stability within a region and export to other regions to further global security and stability. This involves a balance between what a partner country needs to satisfy internal requirements, what coalitions require for transnational requirements, and what capabilities are already present in the region. As shown in figure 1, it also involves a continual reinvestment decision. At some point, a partner needs to sustain the capacity on its own.

**Figure 2. Setting the Capability Objective**




Therefore, the capability investment decision must be a joint one. As shown in figure 2, this process requires a dialogue between the United States/coalition and the partner to balance all needs. All participants need to determine the capability objective. The process must emphasize open dialogue, mutual support, and long-term relationships.

Also note that figure 2 references *capability* and *capacity*. Most U.S. literature references “building partnership capacity” rather than capability. The distinction between the two is critical. *Capacity* refers to the potential to do something. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines capacity as “the facility or power to produce, perform, or deploy; capability.” Thus, it is

institutional infrastructure, processes, and trained people that generate capability. *Capability* is the specific function to be performed, such as demining, border security, logistics, training, or combat power. Building capability without building capacity is like digging a well in barren rock. Building capacity with no capability objective is like running a grocery store that has no inventory. Capability and capacity are two sides of the same coin and must be looked at concurrently.

**Partner will.** Partner national will is a critical component in setting capability objectives. Building capability that a partner never intends to use is pointless. All parties must understand how the partner will employ the capabilities developed. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the will to deploy forces and the will to employ forces. Based on these two variables, planners can determine which constraints the national will puts on any generated capacity. The combination of variables indicated in the upper right quadrant provides the most flexibility; that in the lower left provides the least.

**Figure 3. National Will**




**Figure 4. Employment of National Will**

Figure 4 breaks employment of national will into two components: the will to fight and the will to reduce caveats placed on forces. National caveats prescribe rules and constraints on a nation's forces. They can run the gamut from prohibiting troops from participating in combat operations to constraining them geographically. Caveats limit an operational commander's flexibility and potentially reduce a force's effectiveness. The upper right quadrant of figure 4 shows the combination of variables that provides the most flexibility, while the combination shown at the lower left provides the least flexibility. Capability planners should not focus exclusively on full-spectrum combat operations. All four of these capability types are required for comprehensive security, and planners should identify which capabilities already exist and are accessible and should develop the capability shortfalls, optimizing the contributions from each country.

## Skin in the Game

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
**Determining required capabilities.** Table 1 provides a summary of capabilities that planners could use when looking to develop capabilities for three major types of operations. Planners can add two more columns that let them track what they have and note where they may go to meet capability shortfalls. The categories of major combat operations, irregular warfare, and peace operations are not crisp and distinct. Any given operation will likely involve all three categories.

**Table 1. Capabilities Matrix**

Capabilities	MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS		IRREGULAR WARFARE	PEACE OPERATIONS			
	Combat Operations	Postcombat		Counter-insurgency	Peacemaking	Peace Enforcement	Peacekeeping
Land Combat Operations	X		–	X	–		
Air Combat Operations	X	–	X	X	–		–
Special Operations	X	X	X	X	X		X
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction		X					X
Peace Monitoring							
Compliance Monitoring		X			X	X	X
Construction	–	X			–	–	X
Demining		–				–	–
Humanitarian Assistance	–	X	X	–	–	X	X
Consequence Management	–	–			–	–	–
Sustainment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Deployment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Medical	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Command and Control	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Based on the capability requirements and the operational priorities, planners can then rate capabilities as shown in figure 5. The combination of the capabilities matrix in table 1 and the rating matrix in figure 5 provides a clear way to determine capability requirements and their relative importance.

Figure 5. Capability Rating Matrix



**Determining capacity.** The final determinant in capability is the partner nation capacity—that is, the country’s ability to build and to *sustain* capabilities. Planners should avoid “one-off” capability generation wherever possible; the goal should be to jointly invest in sustainable capability that meets both the partner’s and the U.S./coalition’s capability requirements.


Capacity revolves around doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Planners will need to evaluate the partner’s institutional capacity in terms of DOTMLPF and

then determine how much they will need to invest in building that capacity as well as the desired capability. For example, if the capability goal is to build and sustain a deployable infantry company, the planners must determine whether the partner nation has the capacity to recruit, train, and retain soldiers and leaders. Planners need to assess the partner's training, basing, and support facilities. They will also need to determine whether the partner has an interoperable doctrine that will allow the company to integrate with U.S./coalition forces as well as the equipment required for integration. Then, planners will need to determine the overall organizational structure required to sustain a deployed company. The partner nation may well need to build a battalion to ensure that it can continuously deploy an infantry company. Obviously, the building of institutional capacity could significantly increase the cost to build capability. These costs will encumber the investment decision and factor into the overall return on investment. However, depending on the partner, investing in capacity-building may be just as important as investing in capability-building. The full spectrum of political-military considerations needs to taken into account, as well as existing capacity infrastructure that can be shared.

**Interoperability.** The ability to work with coalition forces is also critical to success in almost any operation. The common NATO interoperable framework outlined by the Standard NATO Agreements is perhaps the best benchmark for most measures of interoperability. As the partner's capabilities increase, the relationship should seek to build higher degrees of interoperability not only with doctrine and weapons systems, but also in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Greater degrees of interoperability and capabilities allow the partners to participate in increasingly complex and demanding situations and perform more sophisticated tasks. As the levels of interoperability and capabilities con-

tinue to increase, the partner could graduate into “framework” nations that can coordinate with other partners for capability- and capacity-building. This relationship is shown in figure 6.


**Figure 6. Capability and Interoperability Matrix**



## INVESTMENT AND REINVESTMENT DECISIONS

Investment decisions at their essence are governed by a calculus of risk versus reward. Figure 7 provides a matrix to help planners determine the relative value/reward for a capability investment. Risk is measured as shown in figures 3 and 4. If a country is not willing to build and employ/deploy capability, then risks will be higher. Other risks include partner country stability and ability to sustain a capability once it is built. The driving factor is to ensure the highest risk-adjusted return on investment possible. Portfolio theory broadens this scope by managing a basket of investments that spread the risk and provide a suitable overall return. Portfolio managers constantly rebalance their portfolio to remove underperforming assets and invest in new assets with a higher expected risk-adjusted return.

**Figure 7. Capacity Investment**



Investing in partner capacity is not significantly different than maintaining any other investment portfolio. The capability portfolio manager must determine investment priorities, devise ways to rate potential investments, and develop and process methods for managing investments and redeploying investments where appropriate.

The foregoing discussion provides the framework to help the capability portfolio manager decide what to invest in and when to redeploy an investment. Because investments must compete for limited resources, portfolio managers need tools to help them make consistent, rational decisions. The spreadsheet in table 2 provides an example of a rating tool based on the factors discussed above as well as on the amount and duration of the expected investment. Ideally, the scores for a country will be the same regardless of capability, with the potential exception of caveats. A country could put different caveats on specific capabilities or within specific operations. The scores for a capability will vary depending on the operational importance.

Note that three of the ratings have negative scores. The more caveats a country employs, the more of a penalty it is assessed. Likewise, the larger the investment required and the longer the duration, the more of a penalty is assessed.

## Skin in the Game

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Financial scoring will have a standard set of metrics that award scores based upon investment amount and duration.

**Table 2. Investment Rating Sheet**

Investment ID					
Country					
Capability					
Description					
Operation					
Anticipated costs					
Startup					
Ongoing					
Funded years					
	Weight	Scale	Score	Weighted Score	Capability Score
<b>Capability Rating</b>	3				
Operational importance		1–10		0	
Capability importance		1–10		0	
					0
<b>Country Rating</b>	2				
Will to fight		1–10		0	
National caveats		-10–0		0	
Will to deploy		1–10		0	
Capacity status		1–10		0	
Political-military considerations		1–10		0	
					0
<b>Financial Rating</b>	1				
Investment scale		-10–0		0	
Investment length		-10–0		0	
					0
<b>Capability Score</b>					0

The capability portfolio manager can use the matrices discussed above to create scatter charts based on country, capability, and investment ratings. The capability scores and the investment requirements can then be summarized in a portfolio analysis to determine funding priorities.

Portfolio managers must schedule time to review portfolio performance and determine when to rebalance the portfolio or redeploy investments. Generally, investments are redeployed when:

- the situation changes. The capability, operation, or country dynamics changes and requires a rescore. The new score could trigger an investment decision based upon the total portfolio.
- the partner country is unable to build the capability.
- the partner country becomes able to sustain the capability without further outside investment.

## CAPACITY-BUILDING PROCESSES AND RESOURCES

Capability-building requires a comprehensive system to coordinate and synchronize the planning, resources, processes, and infrastructure required to generate and sustain the effort. The entire process must be coordinated at all levels to ensure policies, processes, and priorities are aligned and complementary. In many cases, this will require coordinating not only U.S. efforts, but also coalition efforts. Planners must develop comprehensive capability-building campaign plans that incorporate the entire system and the organizations and plans.

**Strategy and planning.** Given the scope of authorities, funding, plans, policies, and processes, capability planning must be conducted on an integrated, campaign basis. It must be both top down and bottom up.

The national level must set overarching priorities and coordinate integrated resourcing approaches to achieve them. For example, DOD should set the capability priorities and operational priorities in the sample rating system in table 2. Senior leadership must ensure there is a consistent approach to capability-building and planning across the spectrum of all agencies involved in the process.

At the country level, Ambassadors and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) officers must understand the country and articulate the “art

of the possible” to inform higher plans. Their Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) and the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Country Campaign Plan (CCP) must be nested. Both plans need to clearly state capability-building objectives that are both achievable and defined from the process articulated above; a sample goal might be to “develop the capability to conduct a sustained deployment, in conjunction with NATO, of a light infantry company for full-spectrum combat operations to respond to global security crisis within the next two years.” This goal clearly states the need for not only a trained, interoperable light infantry company, but also the entire DOTMLPF capacity process required to sustain it and rotate companies through long-lasting operations such as Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF). A similar example of a goal in the security sector might be to “develop the capability to operate an incident management command and control system that provides integrated communications from first responders to a national level operations center and provides an integrated Common Operational Picture and decision support tools in order to respond to national and regional crises within the next two years.”

As capability managers look at these objectives, they need to ask several questions:

- What capacity needs to be in place to achieve the capability objective?
- Do any supporting capabilities also need to be in place to achieve the capability objective?
- Does this objective nest with the goals and priorities in the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), MSP, and CCP?
- Who is best positioned to help the partner develop this capability?

Higher level guidance from the GCC and cooperation with the partner nation must inform these plans. The GCC’s Theater Campaign Plan must contain a coherent framework that lays out priorities, theater and

regional objectives, and resourcing and coordinating mechanisms. They must work with all parties to develop crisp, concise CCPs that contain achievable objectives that support the TCP. The GCC's component commands then need to develop their implementation plans to accomplish the objectives.

**Funding.** Funding is the critical enabler of all other resources and processes. Without a dedicated, steady, multiyear source of funding, the United States cannot sustain capability-building efforts. However, we need to work with our coalition partners more to spread the costs of building capabilities.

In addition to dedicated, steady funding, capability-building requires a coordinated and, where possible, centrally managed approach to funds management. Investment decisions need to be closely coordinated and synchronized into a campaign level approach to capacity-building. Without a single fund approach, managers could potentially reprogram funds away from capability efforts or into other funds that do not build capability. If laws prohibit a single fund manager, then country plans must be closely coordinated and reflect a common capability generation plan and be tightly managed to ensure synchronization and coordination.

Funding sources allow fund managers and congressional activities to track spending and ensure it follows the intent of the law.


**Authorities.** Authorities govern what we can legally do—both actions and funding. They are law and therefore require congressional action to update and to change. Current authorities such as Title 10 and Title 22 govern engagement with partner nations. Other authorities such as 1206, 1207, and 1208 govern funding for various partner engagements and capability-building. The multitude of authorities can greatly complicate coordinated capability-building as a comprehensive campaign plan may span multiple authorities, each with its own unique set of permissions, constraints, and authorities.

The theory behind authorities is sound. They ensure that we follow the law and provide a way to trace activities back to a legal source. As we saw in Iraq, when authorities are loose or nonexistent, bad things can happen. However, if the theory is taken to an extreme, the guidelines become handcuffs and impede legal program execution. Well-crafted authorities strike a balance between effective control and manageable execution.

**Processes.** The entire constellation of capability generation efforts from planning to funding to execution must reside in a well-defined system of integrated processes. This system must be seamless from the country team through the combatant command and the interagency process. As with policies, each of the organizations shown in figure 8 has its own processes that need to be coordinated and synchronized. As with policies, the capability campaign planner must understand who owns the processes and how they can be modified if they conflict with one another.

**Infrastructure.** While *policies* do not have the force of law, they likewise govern what can and cannot be done in capability-building campaigns. Capability campaign planners must understand the governing policies and who sets and enforces them. Not only do the planners need to work within the bounds of the policies, but they also need to understand how to change those policies if their constraints prevent them from building comprehensive campaigns. Each of the organizations shown in figure 8 has its own plans and policies that need to be coordinated and synchronized. This is especially important in capability-building efforts that involve coalitions. The coalition and each of its members may have different plans and policies that reflect different priorities. If planners are not careful, this can result in conflicting goals or duplicated efforts.

Figure 8. Capability-building Network



Capability-building requires a dedicated *organization* to plan and execute. Without planners who understand capability-building authorities, funding mechanisms, and processes, we will not generate effective plans. Without dedicated leaders and Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who understand the art of capability-building and can maintain the relationships that are its cornerstone, we will not effectively engage our partners. Without training facilities and resources, capability programs will be continually hamstrung and ad hoc.

At the national level, there must be capability-building organizations at DOD, DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Security Council (NSC). These bodies must manage the overall process and coordinate with each other. Key functions at the national level include:

- establishing overall priorities
- conducting congressional liaison for authorities and funding
- establishing the cooperation/coordination framework for coalition capability-building efforts
- establishing resource policies and allocating resources to the GCCs and Embassies
- designating and resourcing national level operations
- coordinating interagency capability-building
  - DOD: military
  - DOS: nonmilitary security sector
  - DHS: engaging partners on cooperative security.

The critical capability-building organization will be at the GCC, which is the hub of all capability-building efforts within its region.

Key functions at the GCC level include:

- planning and synchronizing all military capability-building efforts in the theater
  - coordinating capability-building plans within the TCP, component plans, and the various CCPs
  - managing the programming and resourcing for capability-building efforts
- conducting strategic outreach/communications to partner nations to develop, nurture, and sustain the key relationships required to build capability and capacity and to jointly identify capability- and capacity-building objectives
- coordinating capability-building training programs and the operation of capability-building centers of excellence and training facilities
- coordinating logistics support (equipping, transportation, sustainment) for capability-building programs

- coordinating capability programs with other programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- coordinating 1206, 1207, 1208 initiatives with the appropriate Embassies
- coordinating capability programs with exercises
- coordinating efforts with DOS and DHS
- coordinating efforts with coalition partners in theater
- coordinating capability efforts with DOD and other GCCs and DOD agencies
- coordinating stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) planning and efforts with DOS and other agencies.

The Embassy team is perhaps the most effective example of the inter-agency process at work. The Chief of Mission coordinates almost all aspects of the interagency process. These efforts are reflected in both the MSP and the execution. Some of the capability generation activities include:

- coordinating the development of a comprehensive MSP that includes capability objectives
- working with partner nation leadership to jointly determine capability objectives and a joint plan to generate them
- coordinating all aspects of planning and execution
- leading and managing the strategic communications within the effort
- coordinating all Title 22 funding with the GCC to ensure consistent priorities and objectives
- coordinating with the GCC on all 1206, 1207, 1208 initiatives
- managing any required SSTR efforts.



# Capability-building

## Current State of the Art

Partner capability-building is not new. Since its inception, the United States has been involved in the process as either a client or a builder. Arguably, the French and the Dutch engaged in building partner capabilities during the American Revolutionary War. Both governments provided financing, training, and equipment to help the Americans defeat the British. The Lend-Lease program and others were capability-building programs during World War II. Other capabilities began at least as early as the John F. Kennedy administration with the birth of the Special Forces, whose primary mission is to build partner capability.

### CURRENT AUTHORITIES AND FUNDING

Partnership capability-building efforts do not suffer from a lack of authorities. As tables 3 through 7 show, an abundance of authorities span a range of different activities. There is an authority for just about any kind of capability-building activity one can imagine. While most of the emphasis on these tables is for military capacity-building, there are some, such as 1207 (see table 7), that are for nonmilitary requirements. There are other authorities for civil security as well that GCCs normally will not access.

The problem is not the lack of authorities. Rather, it is the plethora of authorities, often with different agencies and approval mechanisms. As the case studies in table 10 and figure 9 show, the volume of authorities and approval requirements can overly complicate even relatively straight-

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forward, low-cost projects. The current mix of authorities pushes the balance too far to the control side and impedes program execution—often with little real gain in control.

**Table 3. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Full-spectrum Training and/or Equipping of Partner Nation Forces**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Coalition Readiness Support Program</b>	Provide specialized training and loan equipment and supplies on a nonreimbursable basis to partner nations contributing forces to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Only loans a limited set of equipment (5–6 common items) to partner nations; insufficient to support entire range of partner nation requirements or forces being offered (for example, Special Operations Forces)</li><li>■ Does not have dedicated funding; as a subset of Coalition Support Funds, the availability of funds depends on reimbursements to Pakistan and Jordan</li><li>■ Single-year authority</li></ul>
<b>Section 1206</b>	Provide training and equipment to critical regional partners to meet “urgent and emergent” threats or opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Congress has indicated that it should go first and foremost to projects in countries that face a known terrorist threat and lack the resources to build their military’s counterterrorism capacity</li><li>■ Not intended for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (though there is indication that this may change)</li><li>■ Not intended to support forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan</li><li>■ Funding used for short-term (1-year) projects until transition to Foreign Military Sales possible—not for a program of record</li><li>■ Competitive process and lengthy review/approval</li></ul>
<b>Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (10 U.S.C. §2010)</b>	\$50 million total, of which only \$5 million may be used for training foreign military forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ One-year initiatives only; not intended for multi-year projects and must be fully obligated within the fiscal year in which it is received</li><li>■ Competitive process with up to 60-day processing time</li><li>■ Not intended for equipping</li><li>■ No funds for any activity that has been denied authorization by Congress</li><li>■ Funds will not be used to support initiatives that have other funding sources</li></ul>

The authorities in table 3 form the core of effective capability and capacity generation programs. Currently, they are centrally managed at DOD and DOS (1206 is a “dual-key” program between DOD and DOS that will be addressed later, along with 1207 and 1208). These programs have been overwhelmingly targeted toward a handful of countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan, often at the expense of building capability that will help these countries. The current methods for allocating these funds need to be reviewed along with the entire GEF process. We will analyze this concept below and address potential changes later in this paper.

**Table 4. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Limited Training and/or Equipping of Partner Nation Forces**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA)</b>	Provides for mutual exchange of logistics, supplies, and services (requires consultation with Secretary of State)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Services include partner nation training but restricted to training services (in practice, familiarization/interoperability activities)</li> <li>■ Partner must provide reciprocal support via cash, equal value exchange, or replacement-in-kind</li> <li>■ Many partner nations cannot meet the requirements for equal value exchange or replacement-in-kind to enable U.S. European Command to loan them vehicles under an ACSA</li> </ul>
<b>Enhanced ACSA (Section 1202)</b>	Permits loans of military equipment for personnel protection and survivability to partner nations participating in combined operations in Iraq and Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Use of equipment for no longer than 1 year</li> <li>■ ACSA provisions still apply</li> </ul>

(continued)

**Table 4 (continued)**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (10 U.S.C. §2010)</b>	Supports the incremental expenses incurred by a developing country while participating in a multinational exercise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>Incremental expenses</i> are the reasonable and proper costs of goods and services that are consumed by a developing country as a direct result of that country's participation in a multinational exercise with the United States, including rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation</li> <li>■ Two criteria for eligibility:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The country could not provide the support without specialized training, supplies, and/or equipment</li> <li>■ The country's participation in a multinational exercise with the United States, including rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation</li> <li>■ Training limited to familiarization/interoperability</li> <li>■ Requires Secretary of Defense approval and consultation with Secretary of State</li> <li>■ Only countries on the Department of State developing country list can qualify</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Warsaw Initiative Fund</b>	Supports U.S. and partner nation costs for certain training activities, such as traveling contact teams, State Partnership Program, military liaisons, personnel exchanges, seminars, conferences; selected partner nation participation in bilateral or multilateral exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited to developing (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Partnership for Peace) countries</li> <li>■ Cannot be used to fund exercises and U.S. participation in exercises</li> <li>■ Nation is ineligible once it joins NATO</li> <li>■ Cannot be used to purchase equipment, training, or construction</li> </ul>
<b>Joint Combined Exchange Training (10 U.S.C. §2011)</b>	Supports both U.S. and "incremental" partner nation training costs for training U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Training intended for U.S. SOF</li> <li>■ Does not provide for equipping</li> </ul>

GCCs generally have greater access to the resources controlled by these authorities. Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreements are legal concepts and do not have prescribed budget limits. The other programs tend to be tied to specific programs. Warsaw Initiative Funds funding is geographically constrained and may have a limited future, depending on the Partnership for Peace.

**Table 5. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Provision of Logistical Support to Coalition Partners**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA) and Enhanced ACSA</b>	Provides for mutual exchange of logistics, supplies, and services (requires consultation with Secretary of State)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Services include partner nation training but restricted to training services (in practice, familiarization/interoperability activities)</li> <li>■ Partner must provide reciprocal support via cash, equal value exchange, or replacement-in-kind</li> <li>■ Many partner nations cannot meet the requirements for equal value exchange or replacement-in-kind to enable U.S. European Command to loan them vehicles under an ACSA</li> </ul>
<b>Lift and Sustain</b>	Provision of logistical (such as lift) and sustainment support to partner nations contributing forces to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Does not support provision of training or equipment</li> <li>■ Annual authority (via appropriations)</li> </ul>
<b>Global Lift and Sustain (10 U.S.C. §127c)</b>	Provides logistical support, supplies, and services at no cost to allies participating in combined operations; provides equipment covered by Enhanced ACSA (personnel protection and survivability) to allies participating in combined operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ During active hostilities, contingency operation, or noncombat operation and Allied forces are essential to success and could not participate without logistical support</li> <li>■ Not for countries participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (covered by separate Lift and Sustain authority)</li> <li>■ Not to exceed \$100 million annually; requires Secretary of State concurrence</li> </ul>

Lift and Sustain and Global Lift and Sustain are critical programs that deploy partner capability. Without the resources managed by these authorities, the United States would not be able to support partner deployments to operations such as OEF.

**Table 6. Defense Department Authorities Permitting Other Forms of Support to Coalition Partners**


NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Section 1208</b>	\$35 million/year to support foreign forces that are supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Not intended for training and equipping partner forces outside of operating areas</li><li>■ Requires concurrence of relevant Chief of Mission</li></ul>
<b>Coalition Support Funds</b>	Reimburse countries, primarily Pakistan and Jordan, for expenses incurred while providing logistical and military support to U.S. military operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Single-year authority (via appropriations)</li></ul>

Coalition Support Funds is one of the largest funding sources in the capacity- and capability-building arsenal. Historically, it was limited to a handful of countries. We need to open this funding source to critical efforts that build capacity that supports the countries listed in table 6.

**Table 7. Other Authorities**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Security and Stabilization Assistance (Section 1207)</b>	Allows Secretary of Defense to transfer funds to State to facilitate civilian stabilization missions, bringing civilian expertise to bear alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Not to be used for training by U.S. military forces</li></ul>

Given the abundance of authorities shown above, one would think capability-building would be straightforward and easy. Unfortunately, as figure 9 shows, such is not the case.

**Figure 9. Hungarian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team Building Example**

On the surface, the task of building an operational mentor and liaison team (OMLT) would seem to be fairly limited in scope. These are small teams that embed with Afghan National Army units to help mentor them and provide liaison to coalition forces. Most OMLTs consist of fewer than 30 soldiers and require no heavy equipment. However, the OMLT shown in figure 9, which is not atypical of the process, took 16 months to generate and deploy, largely because of the authorities that needed to be engaged to obtain training, equipment, and support. Eight months elapsed from the decision to use Coalition Support Funds until the funds under this authority were granted and available for use.

Any capability- and capacity-building program will require close coordination between Title 10 and Title 22 funding sources (see tables 8 and 9). Because both DOD and DOS control these funding sources, any successful capability- and capacity-building program needs to be coordinated between the two departments. By law, DOD does not have funding authorities for any train and equip missions.

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**Table 8. Title 10 Authorities**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Operations and Maintenance</b>	Title 10	U.S. military only
<b>Military-to-military</b>	Title 10	U.S. military only
<b>State Partnership Program</b>	New funding source granted after establishment as a program of record	Currently, small funding levels and no established mechanisms to manage program investments; limited to civil security engagement
<b>Counterterrorism Fellowship Program</b>	Up to \$20 million per year of its budget “to pay any costs associated with the attendance of foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, or security officials at United States military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted under the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program”	Nonlethal training
<b>Exercise-related Construction</b>		Must support an approved exercise

**Table 9. Title 22 Authorities**

NAME	AUTHORITY	LIMITATIONS
<b>Foreign Military Sales</b>	Title 22	Department of State (DOS)-managed as part of the overall foreign assistance program
<b>Foreign Military Financing</b>	Title 22	DOS-managed as part of the overall foreign assistance program
<b>International Military Education and Training</b>	Title 22	DOS-managed as part of the overall foreign assistance program

When we look at the critical 1206, 1207, and 1208 programs, the need to coordinate and jointly plan is even more important. These programs are “dual-key” programs established by Congress. DOD moves Title 10 funds into Title 22 for the purposes shown in tables 3, 6, and 7. Both DOD and DOS must jointly approve the expenditures in these programs. This provides DOD a little more input into the Title 22 process. Congress watches these programs and has, in the past, threatened to curtail them over concern of crossing jurisdictional boundaries.

The Hungarian SOF company deployment shown in table 10 offers a second example of the complexities involved in building partner capability and capacity. Note that even though the cost is extremely low, the project spanned 14 different authorities for legal permissions and funding. The complexities involved in coordinating these multiple lines of authorities can add months to a deployment.

## Skin in the Game

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
**Table 10. Hungarian Special Operations Forces Example**

FUNCTION	SUPPORT PROVIDED	COST (\$THOUSANDS)	AUTHORITIES
<b>Train</b>	Psychological Operations Qualification Course, Joint Terminal Attack Control/Special Operations Terminal Attack Control, Joint Special Operations University Operational Planners Course, Aviation Training with 6 <sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron, Special Operations Forces Mobile Training Team, Special Forces Qualification Course Mobile Training Team	3,040	International Military Education and Training, Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund, Joint Contact Team Program, State Partnership Program, Military-to-military, Excess Defense Articles Operations and Maintenance
<b>Equip</b>	Team Equipment for 2 <sup>d</sup> Special Forces Company, Ground Laser Target Designators II, Blue Force Trackers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Jammers	8,080	Foreign Military Financing, 1206, Coalition Support Funds
<b>Transport</b>	Strategic airlift to/from International Security Assistance Force	640	To be determined
<b>Sustain</b>	Medical facility, isolation facility, weapons cage, support center improvements	450	Exercise-relation Construction, Excess Defense Articles, Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civil Aid
<b>Total</b>		12,210	14 different authorities

## PLANNING

The capability-building network depicted in figure 8 shows the nesting of the key plans required to build partner capability and capacity. This network of plans and programs needs to flow both top down and bottom up. The national level controls authorities and resources, as well as setting critical policies that shape capability- and capacity-building plans and programs. Down at the country level is where the rubber meets the road. This is the level where critical relationships are forged and the country and the United States/coalition agree to essential objectives. Resourcing guidance and policy need to effectively flow down from the national level, and resource requirements need to flow up from the country level. At the theater level, the GCC provides the natural place where resources and resource requirements meet and plans are fully vetted and analyzed. Figure 10 shows this critical planning nexus.

**Figure 10. Capability-building Network: Geographic Combatant Command Focus**



## PHASE ZERO

Operations are often planned with five phases, ranging from buildup through combat operations through SSTR. *Phase zero* refers to nonoperational activities in many of our partner countries that include defense sector reform and capability- and capacity-building. There is a great deal of overlap between these phase zero activities and SSTR activities—so much so that the same organizations and processes that do SSTR in an operational construct could potentially be used to perform phase zero activities. Currently, the United States sources Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other efforts out of hide and ad hoc. These organizations currently do not have a table of distribution and allowances that will survive the operations they support.

The primary planning document is the GEF. While this is an excellent approach to planning, it is not set up to effectively manage building partner capability and capacity. The emphasis—rightly so—is on sustaining combat operations. However, the GEF focuses on sustaining U.S. capabilities and does not adequately reflect the priority of effectively resourcing key partner capability- and capacity-building efforts. Such capabilities, which allow the United States to better manage the strain on its forces, are potentially as important as U.S. force structure.

DOS manages much of its capability- and capacity-building through the *F process*, which integrates all of the planning for Title 22 and other resources. As shown in table 9, at least three critical military capacity-building programs lie within Title 22, as does most of the responsibility for the training and equipping of partners. Historically, this process has been somewhat opaque to outsiders, especially DOD. In addition, DOS can elect to reprogram funding from one Title 22 program to another, perhaps without coordination and input from DOD. Therefore, DOD may rely upon funding sources and plans for which it has little or no control or input in the process.

NATO, through Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), conducts OMLT planning and coordinates through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for requirements. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe coordinates most of these planning efforts within SHAPE. OMLTs are absolutely critical to making sure the Afghan National Army units are capable of assuming security responsibilities and allowing NATO to successfully hand over security responsibilities to the Afghans and reach an endstate. Both troop-contributing nations and NATO share OMLT training responsibilities. The United States, through the State Partnership Program, provides OMLT augmentation and training to selected partners if required.

The GCCs conduct partner capability and capacity planning as part of their theater campaign plan process. Building partner capability and capacity is an integral part of the GCC's theater security cooperation plan. This process is informed by the GEF and in turn informs the CCPs for the countries in the GCC area of responsibility (AOR). The TCP should establish umbrella goals and coordinate regional efforts. GCCs may develop regional campaign plans as appropriate to coordinate regional requirements or when the various regions within the AOR have different characteristics and requirements.

The GCC and its components should conduct integrated, parallel planning efforts, much as they do in an operational campaign. The same core planning functions that the GCC and components use in operational planning translates directly to theater security cooperation planning. Components should dynamically participate in the development of the CCPs, just as they do in an operational plan. Therefore, GCCs need to establish planning mechanisms and collaborative systems that promote this integrated effort.

The country team is perhaps the best example of a functioning and integrated interagency effort. There are two critical planning documents

at the country level. The Embassy produces the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), which governs all efforts within the Embassy. The ODC and the GCC prepare a country campaign plan that defines the military engagement within the country. Capability- and capacity-building are a critical part of the CCP. The MSP and the CCP need to be synchronized and in harmony with each other.

The CCP should support the objectives identified in the security sector portion of the MSP. From a capability- and capacity-building perspective, this portion of the MSP is the most critical. This section should coordinate all security sector initiatives, both civil and military, into a mutually supporting, comprehensive approach. It should also address key security sector Title 22 funding issues such as FMF and IMET. Any joint 1206 projects should also be addressed in the MSP. If these projects are not jointly addressed and coordinated with the GCC, they most likely will not get funded and approved.

The CCP is where the rubber meets the road for the GCC. The CCP should clearly express the capability- and capacity-building objectives for the country. These objectives should drive funding requirements for 1206, FMF, and IMET and provide the guidance for the components to prepare their engagement plans for the country.

The CCP should be synchronized with the security sector portion of the MSP. Ideally, the CCP should be able to function both as a standalone document for the GCC to direct planning to its components as well as a supporting document to the MSP. The CCP should state capacity- and capability-building objectives crisply and cleanly. It should provide the requisite level of detail and tasks to enable the components to build effective engagement and capability-/capacity-building plans. As mentioned above, 1206 projects and other joint funding and mutually supporting requirements should be coordinated in both the MSP and the CCP.

Where appropriate, the CCP should also address civic engagement priorities that help to set the conditions for a strong partner relationship and selected capacity enabling functions.

The Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force components that each GCC has are essentially its execution arm. Therefore, the component plans are where the details of partner capability- and capacity-building need to be specified as well as the particular engagement activities and resource requirements. Component plans should address the specific details of how they will meet the objectives laid out in the CCP. These plans should address engagements, exercises, and senior visits, as well as key civic engagement projects.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan regional planning effort works to provide better coordination between NATO operations in Afghanistan and U.S. support for Pakistan. Given the flow of fighters back and forth from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan and the increasingly unstable eastern provinces in Afghanistan, this is a critical effort. The creation of a single DOS representative to manage the efforts is a tremendous step forward in regional integration and could be a model for other efforts.

## CURRENT PROGRAMS

**State Partnership Program.** The State Partnership Program (SPP) is perhaps the most economic and effective engagement tool in the GCC toolkit. National Guard forces partner with countries in the GCC AOR and build strong relationships through traveling contact teams and familiarization exchanges. In addition, the state adjutant general and other key leaders regularly conduct senior leader engagements with the partner nations' military and civilian leadership. Often, these relationships are the strongest relationships the GCC has with the partner nation.

SPP was finally designated a program of record in 2009, after which it received dedicated funding. This funding is centrally managed by the National Guard Bureau and is designated primarily for civil security engagements. These funds will allow the GCC to bring in targeted state agencies as well as National Guard troops and Airmen to conduct comprehensive, full-spectrum engagement.

SPP must be tightly integrated into the GCC theater security cooperation plan and all subsidiary planning. In addition, the GCC should include the states in the planning teams as their long relationships have often produced key insights for planning and helping the GCC to identify objectives and engagement opportunities.

**Operation Enduring Freedom.** OEF is targeted primarily at the defeat of al Qaeda and militant Taliban forces in Afghanistan. As part of these efforts, however, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) helps to build Afghan security forces consisting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. CSCT–A’s efforts are absolutely vital to OEF success. The United States and ISAF will not be able to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban and maintain security and stability without a trained and effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

**Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).** While U.S. combat operations in OIF are winding down, there could be continued requirements for security engagement and capacity-building with the Iraqi military and security forces. Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC–I) coordinates the training and support for this effort.

**OMLT generation.** OMLTs are coalition teams designed to embed into ANSF units to help train them and to coordinate critical combat enabling functions when the ANSF unit is in combat. These teams are the coalition analogs to the U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs).

Each battalion or higher unit in the ANSF should have either an ETT or an OMLT embedded within it to engage in both training and operations in order to improve unit effectiveness and ultimately enable the ANSF unit to become self-sustaining. Therefore, OMLTs and ETTs are absolutely vital to OEF and ISAF success. Afghanistan simply will not be able to provide for its own security if these teams are not successful. The exit of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan is dependent upon these teams' success.

U.S. and coalition forces, however, are unable to generate enough teams for all ANSF units. With current plans to significantly expand the size of the ANA and to create police OMLTs (POMLTs), the problem will become even more acute.

Therefore, the United States must engage in robust capability-building with our coalition partners to help them to generate the required OMLTs and POMLTs. To date, these efforts have been ad hoc and poorly resourced. The United States and NATO must work together to develop a systematic approach to identify OMLT requirements and to generate properly trained and resourced teams that understand the ANSF doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and Afghan culture. OMLTs, regardless of which country provides them, must understand the ANSF doctrine and TTPs in order to ensure consistency and interoperability.

The one bright spot in the OMLT generation process is the joint U.S.-partner codeployment OMLTs. These are teams formed jointly between National Guard Soldiers and partner soldiers based upon the SPP relationship. While the process has been ad hoc to date, it represents a critical path forward to developing the required number of teams with the necessary capabilities and skill sets.

**U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC)—Israel and Palestine.** The USSC is a military-led effort that works for the State Department to

build the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). Since the PASF is not a military force, DOD does not have the authorities to do the train and equip mission for them. All authorities lie with DOS. In spite of this situation, the USSC has been able to train and equip more than two battalions of PASF. These lightly equipped battalions, to which Israel was initially opposed, have made a significant difference in the security situation of the West Bank and have earned Israeli acceptance. The PASF is a critical component of any solution that envisions a Palestinian state. Without an effective PASF, the Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot hope to aspire to a two-state solution and a government that can securely govern its territory. The formation of two battalions is just a beginning. The PASF will need to grow larger and more capable if it is to maintain security within a Palestinian state. The problem is even more significant if the Palestinian state includes Gaza, where the PA currently is not sovereign and does not maintain any PASF units. The USSC is a critical part of any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and will almost certainly need to increase its capability-building capacity as part of any viable way ahead.

**Colombia.** The United States has partnered successfully with Colombia to meet the twin threats of an insurgency and narcoterrorism. As a result, a lot of analysts wonder whether there are precedents in Colombia that can be employed in Afghanistan, which is also plagued by an insurgency and narcoterrorism. While there may be some applicable lessons, there are also clear differences between Afghanistan and Colombia that need to be fully understood. While Colombia is not an ultra-modern country and has a sizeable rural populace, it is a modern country in many respects with a functioning government and an educated workforce. The differences between Colombia and Afghanistan may be as significant as the similarities.

The key lesson, however, is pertinent to Afghanistan. The United States saw a clear national security interest in helping Colombia and made a significant, coordinated effort to help it build its capabilities and capacity to fight the insurgents and narcoterrorists. If we want to replicate the success in Afghanistan, we may not be able to follow the Colombia playbook. Rather, we may want to use the framework and coordinated approach that developed the playbook and develop a uniquely Afghan approach and help our Afghan partners implement and execute it.

## CURRENT ORGANIZATION

**DOD.** Under the George W. Bush administration, DOD established a series of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) to manage programming activities for established portfolios. While this idea made a lot of sense in theory, the practice was somewhat flawed. The Building Partner Capacity (BPC) CPM included not only BPC activities, but also a plethora of other activities such as information operations. In many respects, it became the “catch-all” CPM. This greatly diluted its effectiveness and sent a negative message about the importance of building capacity and capability. The Obama administration has not officially disbanded the CPM approach but does not seem to be using them.

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).** DSCA is considered DOD’s premier security cooperation body—except that it really is not. DSCA is far more of a security assistance organization than a security cooperation organization. The name of its flagship program, Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM), says it all. DISAM is far more involved with managing foreign military sales programs than security cooperation programs. Most of DSCA’s efforts are still weighted toward selling U.S. military hardware than toward working with our partners to generate and sustain targeted capabilities. The security assistance programs tend to follow after the initial security

cooperation programs required to jointly establish capability objectives and then manifest them. DISAM needs to spend as much time training U.S. representatives on working to develop capabilities as it does teaching them to manage complex FMS cases.

Given the different dynamics between many security assistance and capability-building programs, DSCA potentially needs to teach two different courses depending on where the security assistance personnel will be deployed. Very few countries require both complex FMS case management and the dynamics of joint capability generation. Poland is clearly an example where both programs are required. But outside of Poland and some other former Warsaw Pact nations, the distinction is much sharper.

DSCA's strategic plan clearly positions the organization to become far more involved in capability programs. It is a logical place to build much of the connective tissue that we need in partner capability-building. It has the schools, the institutions, and the organizational weight to make an enormous contribution. However, it may need to refocus some of its efforts to achieve this potential.

**NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM–A).** This mission will further support the development of capable and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Forces. It will comprise senior-level mentoring of the ANA and an expanded role in developing a professional Afghan National Police. NTM–A will be collocated with CSTC–A, and one individual will be dual-hatted as the commander of both.

The NATO investment in NTM–A should help to broaden the coalition support for ANSF capability-building and improve OMLT and other capability generation.

**NATO Training Mission—Iraq (NTM–I).** NTM–I may be getting a new lease on life. NATO and Iraq are nearing a new agreement to allow NTM–I to remain in Iraq and work with Iraqi security forces. The NATO

presence in Iraq will help to ensure a continued coalition approach to Iraqi security.

**USCENTCOM.** United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is the supported command for the two critical U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most capability generation in place today is to support USCENTCOM’s efforts. In order to coordinate the generation of Afghan and Iraqi capabilities, USCENTCOM has stood up two commands within these operations that report directly to the operational commanders. While CSTC–A and MNSTC–I have effectively coordinated the building of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, they are neither permanent organizations nor do they have organic capability-building forces. Both organizations need to pull personnel—often key leadership—from the operating force. Depending on how these requirements are sourced, this process can play havoc with brigade reset and the Army Force Generation process.

In conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF, and the international community, and nested with the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan commander’s intent, CSTC–A plans, programs, and implements the generation and development of the ANSF in order to enable Kabul to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan. As noted above, the commander of CSTC–A will be dual-hatted as the NTM–A commander. As part of this transformation, CSTC–A’s key capability-building execution arm—Task Force (TF) Phoenix—will move from CSTC–A to direct operational control of the newly forming intermediate headquarters. TF Phoenix runs the ETTs and OMLTs that are embedded within the ANSF and is therefore the critical capability organization. While this change may improve operational control, it could impact the mission and focus of CSTC–A/NTM–A, which may assume a more institutional and capacity-building role as a result.

MNSTC-I, in partnership with NTM-I, USM-I, and other organizations, assists the interior and defense ministries and the Counterterrorism Bureau, generates and replenishes Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and improves their quality and institutional performance in order to increase ISF capability to assume responsibility for population protection and to develop Iraqi security institutions capable of sustaining security with reduced coalition involvement.

With the current plans to wind down combat operations in Iraq, MNSTC-I will almost certainly transform as well. It could maintain its focus and ensure Iraqi units have embedded military transition teams, or it could morph into an organization similar to the U.S. missions in Kuwait, Egypt, and Colombia. The two keys will be the state of the ISF and the size of the footprint the United States can—and is willing to—maintain in Iraq.

**Department of State.** The core mission of the State Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.

The Civilian Police program in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs focuses on meeting the demand for law enforcement, criminal justice, and corrections experts and assistance in postconflict societies and complex security environments. The Foreign Assistance Framework objective for this program is Peace and Security, the program area is Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform, and the program elements are Operations Support and Law Enforcement, Reform, Restructuring, and Operations.

## ANALYSIS

Our current system is fractured and reactive to the immediate circumstances rather than taking a systematic, holistic approach to global security requirements. These requirements cannot—and should not—be solved by the United States in isolation. At present, we tend to approach building partner capability and capacity on a one-off basis.

The United States has many of the authorities, funding mechanisms, institutions, and planning constructs in place to effectively develop partner capacity and capability. However, it lacks an overall integrative approach. But even more important, while U.S. strategy and policy state that building partner capability and capacity is critical, U.S. actions do not reflect this priority. The Nation has skin in the game in certain areas—we are spending enormous sums in Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt, for example—but not overall. When a need arises for a specific requirement, we tend to cobble together authorities, funding, programs, and organizations. There is little or no systemic approach to building partner capabilities and capacity in the global security and stability context, and almost no recognition that this effort by itself helps to make the globe a safer place and one more conducive to U.S. interests.

If we are serious about the need to build partner capability and capacity, we need to conduct a complete review and overhaul of our system to include authorities, funding mechanisms, processes, and organizational structures.

**Funding.** An enormous percentage of our security assistance budget each year goes to two countries—Egypt and Israel. The United States began this funding nearly 30 years ago as part of the Camp David agreements between the two. At the time, the funding made a great deal of sense. In the intervening years, however, the situation has changed. It may well be time to seriously reevaluate the return that we

get on this enormous security assistance investment and whether it is time to redeploy it.

In addition, most security assistance funding is provided through Title 22, which is controlled by DOS. These funds are part of the overall DOS budget for foreign assistance and can be reprogrammed, perhaps without any coordination. The DOS F Process greatly complicates security assistance funding and execution. Given the often technical issues that span the entire DOTMLPF set of requirements, the F Process may not be the best way to manage security assistance funds. We may need to establish a process that separates security assistance funding from the rest of the foreign assistance funding in order to ensure both DOD and DOS have adequate visibility and control.

Arguably, 1206/1207/1208 funding provides this dual-key approach. However, these funds do not have the flexibility of normal funding within Title 22 security assistance funding. Their application is significantly constrained, leaving many important capability- and capacity-building programs ineligible for funding. In addition, they are capped and the approval process is complex and opaque. Congress has also placed significant constraints on the programs and has nearly canceled them several times. They live on a year-to-year basis.

Furthermore, we need an effective adjudication system to handle disagreements on security assistance funding between DOD and DOS. The phrase “Heads I win, tails you lose,” often captures the current situation. Both DOS and DOD have critical insights into partner requirements and national strategy. Thus, both departments need to have equal voices in establishing priorities and allocating resources for security assistance.

**Authorities.** As we have seen, the authorities required to manage even small programs are exceedingly complex. While there are many good reasons for the existence of authorities such as program control, accountability, and funds management, we need to streamline the complex, often

Byzantine maze of authorities and simplify the process for program managers. We need to establish the minimum number of authorities that provide the required control and accountability.

**Organization.** At present, the United States does not have an organization that manages the complete process of building partner capability and capacity. Rather, organizations develop on an ad hoc basis and then try to interface with each other where they can. This creates competing demands for which there is little or no mechanism for adjudicating differences, establishing priorities, and rationally allocating resources.

We need a systematic approach and defined organizational structure and processes to manage the capability-building network flow shown in figure 8, which actually oversimplifies the process as it reflects only one geographic combatant command and does not include the multiple DOD and DOS agencies that have roles in or influence over capability- and capacity-building. In addition, the individual Services often get involved in a target country, sometimes without coordinating with the GCC in order to push Service-specific programs. Finally, while figure 8 shows coalitions as part of the process, it understates how complex the interaction with coalition partners in capability- and capacity-building can be. Coalition partners may have competing requirements and hence duplicate or fragment the overall effort within a selected partner country.

DSCA, at least by name, seems to have a master role in coordinating security assistance. However, the organization is focused on FMS and, to a lesser extent, FMF and IMET and does not take a comprehensive approach to the entire process of security cooperation. We may need to reassess DSCA's organization and mandate to make it more adaptable to meet emerging security cooperation requirements and perhaps provide more coordinating processes to ensure the entire DOD capability- and capacity-building system is properly coordinated.

“ These NSF [PASF] troops, who replaced either Israeli soldiers or Palestinian gangs, have been warmly received by the locals. Recently, NSF forces wiped out a Hamas cell in Qalqilya, and took losses themselves. The death of the Hamas fighters drew nary a peep, but a memorial service for the NSF soldiers killed drew thousands of people. For the first time, I've heard top Israeli military officers say these new Palestinian troops are professional and for real. ”

—*Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, August 8, 2009*

# Capability-building A Way Ahead

As the epigraph and evidence from Colombia and Iraq show, capacity-building programs can be successful. We have had many programmatic successes in building partner capability and capacity. However, almost all of them had to be built from scratch and have their funding and authorities assembled—in many cases by program-specific legislation. In the case of the PASF, it is almost a skunk works, successful largely because of its leadership quietly making things happen and tirelessly searching to find workarounds.

While the ad hoc program approach does provide success, it does not create easily replicable success in new programs since it is not a systematic approach. It does not provide an effective way to create and manage programs and prioritize, allocate, and, just as importantly, reallocate investments.

In order to effectively put U.S. skin in the capability- and capacity-building game, we need to adopt a far more systematic and holistic approach than the one-off approach we generally take. Even when some of those approaches are huge, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are still largely ad hoc, with a solution developed to meet specific needs and requirements. Whether the solutions involve authorities, funding, programs, or organizations, they are ad hoc. There is practically nothing—other than the ideas and concepts—that we have created in MNSTC–I or CSTC–A that will survive the end of our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These ideas and concepts need to be incorporated into an overall approach and the organizations need to be thoroughly reviewed to determine the best way to build similar organizations for other operations.

Our program building tools need to be easy to use and transparent and provide the proper accountability and controls. They need to be nimble and adjust to changing dynamics. They need to rapidly digest the lessons of successful programs and replicate themselves as appropriate to other programs. They need to be part of a comprehensive system that spans the range of organizations shown in figure 8.

Our investment system needs to be transparent, with well-defined rules and an open portfolio approach to ensure we make rational investment decisions in partner capability and capacity—and redeploy the investment when either the return on investment drops because of changing circumstances or lack of partner participation or will, or because the partner has become capable of sustaining the capability.

We need a central agency or body to manage the processes and to coordinate resource flow, program management training, and investment management and to help rapidly create new programs to meet emerging requirements.

We need to ensure the GCCs are intimately involved in the process and have the capacity to manage one or multiple programs depending upon requirements—and can rapidly stand up and stand down efforts and readily redeploy resources. They must have programmatic authority over the key resources required to build capability and capacity. To do this, the GCCs must have a dedicated organization that can plan, program, and execute partnership capacity-building. They must also have strong relationships with DOS and potentially DHS to coordinate security sector capability- and capacity-building programs.

We should consider a combined, interagency approach to capability- and capacity-building at each GCC. From a combined perspective,

the GCC capability- and capacity-building organization should include highly interoperable and capable framework allies. DOS and DHS should also be key members of this team. Both allies and interagency members should hold positions within the organization and not simply be liaison officers. This organization should coordinate efforts across the range of U.S. and allied interests and requirements.

In addition, a comprehensive approach must include a full spectrum of engagement with our partner countries to set capacity-building objectives. This integrated approach is especially important when we work with partners to build deployable capability to support out-of-area operations. All allied and U.S. interagency expertise must be brought to bear to understand the dynamics of the capability investment decision and to both understand and influence the partner. The best capability programs to support out-of-area operations will not succeed if the partner does not have the national will to deploy the capability.

## AUTHORITIES AND FUNDING

One of the key inhibitors to systematic success is the patchwork quilt of authorities and one-off legislation that complicates any capability- and capacity-building program. Program managers need to invest inordinate amounts of time to cobble together the authorities required for each program, no matter how large or small. In addition, many of the authorities required span Title 10 and Title 22 or require 1206/1207/1208 funding, further complicating any program and adding time to the startup process.


To correct these problems, we need to streamline partnership capability- and capacity-building authorities into a coherent system that a single program manager can readily access and control.

The place to start is with the military-related components of Title 22: IMET, FMF, and FMS. These programs are central to any partnership

program, but they are controlled by the State Department as part of the overall foreign assistance program. The Geographic Combatant Commander, who perhaps best understands the requirements for these programs in their AOR, has no control—and at times little influence—over the programming and budgeting of these funds. The United States needs a regional and global comprehensive approach to managing these authorities and coordinating their employment. While there are statutory limitations on how these funds can be employed, an integrated approach will be far more effective.

Practically every capability- and capacity-building program will require the balancing and integration shown in figure 11. At the GCC level, a combined interagency capability- and capacity-building organization can work together to manage the balancing and integration process to ensure that all funding and authorities are approached as an integrated portfolio that is supported by both DOS and DOD.

**Figure 11. Joint State Department and Defense Department Capability- and Capacity-building**



There must be a similar approach at the national level to integrate and prioritize programs between GCCs, as well as national programs. Potentially, DSCA could form the kernel of a program to perform this task. To do this, however, we will need to transform DSCA and make it a true interagency body for security cooperation. We might also consider renaming DSCA to reflect the interagency approach. The *Partnership Security Cooperation Agency* (PSCA) would be a good name that would encompass inclusion of other agencies such as DHS in addition to DOS and DOD.

Likewise, the GCC will need to take an interagency approach. It needs DOS representatives who have connections throughout DOS from the Embassies back to Foggy Bottom embedded in its capability- and capacity-building organization. They need to be able to link together both the GCC and the DOS programs and provide the clear picture required to deconflict efforts and to create synergy.

At both the national and GCC levels, program managers will need to integrate the capability- and capacity-building programs with the spectrum of other programs that employ Title 22 funding. They must understand the scope and impact of mandated Title 22 spending and work to leverage these mandates as well as discretionary nonsecurity assistance funding.

While there will almost certainly always be a legal separation between Title 10 and Title 22, we can work to create more effective synchronization. The process needs to be far more open and integrated into an overall portfolio management process. The Title 22 funds allocated to security cooperation need to be set aside and jointly programmed in an open manner. When funds need to be reprogrammed, this effort also must be open and include not only DOD and DOS programmers at the national level, but programmers at the regional and GCC level as well.

One possible solution is to move the security portion of Title 22 funding into the 1206/1207/1208 funding. These funds would then have both DOS and DOD funding and be able to use the existing joint funding and approval mechanisms already in place. To do this, Congress would need to strengthen these programs and make them permanent. Currently, 1206/1207/1208 operates on a year-to-year basis. Some Members of Congress are skeptical of the programs and want to eliminate them. Congress may want to consider joint Armed Services/Foreign Affairs committees that provide oversight to the 1206/1207/1208 programs and focus on capability- and capacity-building efforts.

In addition to managing the synergies between Title 10 and Title 22 more effectively, we need to review the spectrum of authorities shown in tables 3 through 7. As the Hungarian examples in table 10 and figure 9 show, the network of authorities required for even small efforts is complex.

The range of authorities exists for good reasons—to provide control, congressional oversight, and accountability. The lack of accountability and control in some of the programs in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly reinforces these needs. We have tremendous sums of money we cannot properly account for and precious little to show for the efforts in some places.


However, a complex basket of authorities that make program development difficult is not the only way to provide the required controls. Modern accounting systems provide both the control and the accountability required to effectively manage these programs. A good accounting system can provide the same level of control without as many of the complexities. As we reengineer DSCA to make it a more effective security cooperation organization, we should include an accounting system that will provide clear controls, reporting, and oversight. DSCA should then be required to provide monthly and quarterly reports to the joint

Armed Services/Foreign Affairs committee for review and analysis. Since DSCA already has a system in place for case management, they may have the core capabilities to expand into overall portfolio management and control.

The concept of portfolio management is key to effective decision-making and program execution. We currently segregate our capability- and capacity-building efforts into separate systems and approval mechanisms, which degrades our ability to manage the overall effort and to make sound investment decisions. Capacity- and capability-building is an investment decision that needs to be approached from an integrated perspective to make sound decisions that maximize limited resources and clearly support U.S. national security objectives. A new PSCA needs to be able to effectively manage these investment portfolios at the national level. The GCCs need to be able to create viable investment proposals that can compete for funding based upon a ranking system similar to that shown in table 2. PSCA should then include an additional set of metrics that reflect national priorities in order to rank the investment proposals and to create an overall portfolio of approved and funded programs. A joint investment board from DOD and DOS should make the investment decisions.

The process may look something like that depicted in figure 12. It envisions two investment board levels. Each GCC will create an interagency joint investment board that includes representatives from DOD, DOS, and other agencies as required. Likewise, the national boards will also be interagency boards with standing members from DOD and DOS and other agencies included as required. The NSC and Congress provide oversight to the process.

**Figure 12. Capability and Capacity Investment Process**



The process should also take into account the existing DOD Capability Portfolio Manager process discussed above. The BPC CPM should be reorganized to include only partnership capability- and capacity-building initiatives rather than the current broad basket of projects it currently manages. As shown in figure 12, it should provide guidance to the PSCA portfolio managers and coordinate their review. If DOS has a similar body, it should also provide guidance and coordination.

## PROGRAMS

Programs exist at both the national and the regional level. At the national level, they should either support named operations or seek to develop specific partnership capabilities. At the regional level, programs should support stated regional or partner country capability-building

efforts. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few key large programs, such as CSTC–A and MNSTC–I and some large national programs such as Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, we do not manage most of our efforts as programs. Far too often, we tend to manage each project and, in some cases, engagement as a separate event rather than linking them to specific objectives and managing them as a program.

Where possible, programs should have well-defined objectives and endstates. For example, we previously discussed the example objective, “Develop the capability to conduct a sustained deployment, in conjunction with NATO, of a light infantry company for full-spectrum combat operations to respond to global security crisis within the next two years.” This objective can then be used to build a program that has a defined endstate, a measurable outcome, and a defined timeline. Based upon the assessment of current capabilities and capacity, the GCC can then develop a program engaging the spectrum of DOTMLPF requirements to accomplish the objective. In the example, the program could consist of familiarization events, training, equipping, building training ranges, defense modernization, and reform engagements and joint exercises to build and to evaluate the capability.

Capability objectives are key to the process. A capability objective clearly states what the partner and the United States and framework nations want to build and why. Building capacity is an enabling task to meet the capability objective. Capacity is a means to an end and not the end itself.

Thus, programs have several key components:

- defined capability objective
- program design and budgeting
- program execution
- program assessment with defined metrics
- program completion.

**Determining the capability objective.** Our discussion in the theory portion of this paper discussed setting a capability objective once a need is established. Figure 2 shows the key steps of determining the need, conducting assessments, and then ensuring the partner’s national will supports the objective. Even when the objective appears to be capacity-oriented, such as in some defense reform and modernization efforts, it should be expressed in capability goals. The purpose of reform and modernization is not simply to create improved processes and structures. These new processes and structures exist to enable capability generation. Thus, rather than state an objective as, “build an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) academy within two years,” the objective should be an enabling task to create interoperable doctrine, which is an enabling task for specific capabilities—such as the full-spectrum light infantry company used in the example above. Granted, the NCO academy and doctrine development will support multiple capability objectives.

We are left with a circular question. Does the capacity come first, or does the capability come first? If we start building capacity before we know what capability we want it to support, we could create structure the partner does not need. The concept is similar to building a factory without knowing the product it will produce. Generally speaking, the factory layout is tailored to the product. Factories are often reengineered when a new product is introduced. Thus, while a project may develop capacity first, the program should do so with the capability objective(s) clearly in mind and support them.

Need can be established in several ways. If the capability is to support ongoing operations, such as ISAF, then the commander validates requirements and asks for capabilities. For ISAF, this is then expressed in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. For operational planning, the need is normally expressed as part of the commander’s capability requirements. These could include U.S. planning, coalition planning,

or planning for the partner nation's security. Another example is to develop capabilities for designed regional forces or response forces. Examples include a Baltic battalion or the NATO response force. Civil security capability needs may be developed through a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities. The capabilities matrix in table 1 may also be useful for force planning requirements.

Once the need is expressed, planners must determine whether sufficient capability exists or whether there is a requirement to build the capability. This starts the assessment process. In some cases, we may already have a specific partner in mind—either because the partner has offered the capability or because we know the partner has a core competency we can build upon. In other cases, we may need to determine which partners may be the best candidates for capability development.

Assessments, therefore, can take two forms. If we do not have a partner identified, the program team will need to conduct a quick assessment to determine likely partners and then discuss the capability-building program with likely candidates. Once we have identified a partner for the program, a more detailed assessment must be conducted to determine the scope of the program.

The qualities shown in figures 3 through 7 are the key data elements that GCCs can use to facilitate these assessments. The GCC can develop a score sheet such as the one shown in table 11. Program managers can then send this sheet out to ODCs, regional education centers such as the Marshall Center, GCC country desk officers, Joint Staff desk officers, and DOS desk officers, and ask for a rating. Regional education centers can assist in developing questionnaires and refining the rating matrix like the one shown in table 11.

**Table 11. Country Rating**

COUNTRY:		Unknown (1)	Weak (2)	(3)	(4)	Moderate (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Strong (10)
Metric											
Will to employ		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Will to deploy		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Will to fight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Will to reduce caveats		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Political importance		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Existing capacity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Interoperability		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Since the evaluation criteria should be consistent across GCCs and PSCA, and other agencies such as the Business Transformation Agency may develop standardized ratings that can be used in surveys and assessments, these groups can also help to develop the tools for graphical depiction of the data.

While these ratings may be subjective, they will probably be close to accurate. The scores can then be updated based on more detailed assessments. Once the scores are averaged, they can be plotted in the matrices shown in figures 3 through 7. The matrices provide a powerful visual plot of the partners, and the quadrants can be very useful in determining potential capabilities that each partner can manifest. For example, the matrix in figure 3 can help the programmer to quickly spot likely candidates for global deployment requirements and rule out those that are less suitable. When combined with the information in figure 6, the planner can narrow the field down even further. The scores can also be used to complete the worksheet shown in table 2.

Once a partner is selected and agrees to the capability objective, the GCC needs to conduct a joint assessment of the partner's current capability and capacity. During the Georgia crisis in 2009, U.S. European

Command developed a modular construct, the Armed Forces Assessment Team (AFAT), to conduct an assessment of the Georgian armed forces. This team provided a “plug and play” approach that can be adapted for general capability and capability assessment teams. The AFAT consisted of a core team that ran the overall assessment and modules that were to be implemented as required to conduct specific portions of the assessment.

The AFAT’s final report may provide a good template for the report. The key is to ensure the report clearly identifies the requirements by DOTMLPF element required to build, sustain, and (if needed) deploy the capability. Each GCC can develop a standing assessment team and execute order template based on this concept.

While the standing country assessment rates the national will, the program manager will need to ensure it is specifically validated for a given capability objective. Ideally, the country team should get a memorandum of agreement signed by the partner’s ministry of defense and ministry of foreign affairs (and ministry of interior as required) as well as the U.S. Ambassador and other framework nation ambassadors that states the agreed capability objective and outlines the program.

**Program design and budgeting.** Once the assessment is complete, the program manager uses the findings in the report to build a specific program design to manifest the capacity objective. The design includes all aspects of DOTMLPF required to build, sustain, and, where appropriate, deploy the capability. The DOTMLPF provides a powerful outline for program design and should be used to group the various activities involved in the design and to ensure the design does not leave out critical components.

The program design should contain as much detail as possible and be jointly developed with the partner and framework partners. It is a partnership document that identifies the tasks to be accomplished, who

## Skin in the Game

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will accomplish them, and who will provide the resources. A potential format is shown in table 12. This table is ideally the front end of a program management database.

**Table 12. Program Design Worksheet**

Country			
Program Name			
Program Objective			
Task	Agent	Resource Provider	Estimated Cost
Doctrine			
Tasks			
Organization			
Tasks			
Training			
Tasks			
Materials			
Tasks			
Leadership			
Tasks			
Personnel			
Tasks			
Facilities			
Tasks			

**Program execution.** Program execution requires continual monitoring and plan updates to effectively manage execution. The GCC needs to establish and maintain positive control over the execution and ensure the program is moving forward to meet the established capability objective and accomplish the designated tasks. Execution agents will need to develop detailed plans and then carry them out.

**Detailed planning.** The program manager should coordinate overall development of the execution plan. As part of this effort, the manager should include the capability objective in the CCP and list the primary tasks assigned to each component or other execution agent. Components/execution agent detailed plans should be program annexes.

Once the program is designed, the execution agent for each task needs to complete a detailed plan for task execution. This includes refining the task details, setting milestones assigning units/personnel and resources, and developing any control measures. Program managers will need to work with the execution agents to ensure all plans are up to date and support any program changes.

To do this, the GCC will need to maintain a capacity-building Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP should include the matrices shown in figures 3 through 7, as well as key metrics that reflect measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

A potential rough-out of a capability-building COP is shown in figure 13. It includes the three key matrices that look at national will for type of forces to build, national will to deploy and employ these forces, and capability and interoperability. The countries in the GCC show up in the appropriate quadrants, depending upon their scores. The countries are hotlinks. Clicking on a country fills in the Focus Country data in the bottom part of the COP. Each of the MOPs and MOEs in this area are hotlinks that can be drilled down into to get information about specific events. The Current Efforts section is a scrollable list that shows countries with current capability-building programs, hotlinked by country and by program.

## Skin in the Game

**Figure 13. Capability-building Common Operational Picture**



MOPs measure whether the program has accomplished planned tasks. As shown in figure 13, these can include engagements (by type), exercises, construction, equipping, deployments, and budget execution. These metrics should give a snapshot of the program execution status. Each metric should be a hotlink that allows drilldown into individual engagements or tasks to provide details.

MOEs measure the effectiveness of the program—in other words, are we doing the right things to achieve the Capability Objective? Potential MOEs shown in figure 13 include changes in will, capability, and interoperability, as well as the number of operational deployments the program produces and the partner’s engagement with other partners in the region, and, if appropriate, a coalition or alliance.

**Program assessment.** Each GCC should develop a Capability-building Executive Steering Council (CBESC), which should convene monthly to assess current programs as well as to approve new programs. As part of the assessment process, program managers should brief current MOPs and MOEs for their programs and recommend program changes based upon their assessment. They should also be prepared to recommend program termination if the capability objective is achieved or if the assessment indicates that it is no longer achievable.

**Program completion.** When a program manager recommends program termination, the CBESC will review the assessment and make a final determination.

If the program is terminated before completion, the CBESC will need to review the political-military issues involved, the impact on the partnership, and potential ways to either change the capability objective to make it achievable or to mitigate the impact of program termination.

If the program is terminated because of completion, the CBESC should determine whether there are follow-on objectives that can expand

the existing program or whether resources should be redeployed to other programs.


In either case, program termination is a critical portfolio management decision. The CBESC should not continue programs simply for the sake of the program or of engagement with a given partner. If the CBESC feels additional engagement is required, it should make a deliberate decision to create a new program.

**Program synchronization.** With any given partner, there may be a multitude of engagement activities across the full range of military events and interagency engagements. Since many interagency efforts are outside the GCC span of control, the GCC Capability COP should also include as many of these efforts as possible to seek ways to synchronize them and develop program synergies. This will require a robust interagency cooperative effort. Depending on the GCC, the CBESC may be periodically expanded to include interagency partners for the review process. In GCCs with a mature interagency process, interagency representatives should be standing members of the CBESC.

The GCC's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or equivalent could be an excellent place to coordinate and synchronize programs. This group should have representatives from many of the agencies that have programs within the GCC AOR. While it cannot direct efforts, it can provide a useful venue for synchronization.

GCCs may want to take the process a step further and create a Partnership Coordination Center (PCC). It would be the center for planning and managing all partnering activities, both military and civilian, within the GCC. Properly structured, a PCC would include both the GCC's theater support command planning and management personnel as well as the interagency representatives normally associated with a JIACG or equivalent organization. A sample structure for a PCC is shown in figure 14.

**Figure 14. Partnership Coordination Center**



Elements in this structure can change as required by the GCC and the partners. The military partnering and civil partnering elements are permanent structures from the GCC. The other elements are from other DOD agencies or other departments. Depending on the situation, there may be NGO/private voluntary organization/intergovernmental organization liaisons under the U.S. Agency for International Development representative, which builds upon existing relationships. The PCC director should be a military 2-star with a civilian deputy.

This center could administer the portfolio management system shown in figure 12 and the program design and budgeting for the GCC. Assessments could be part of the PCC or a separate function in order to strengthen control measures.





# Recommendations

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## **REORGANIZE DSCA IN A JOINT INTERAGENCY SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY.**

- Relabel DSCA as Partnership Security Cooperation Agency and staff it with DOD and DOS personnel. Currently, DSCA is a DOD organization. However, virtually all security cooperation programs require a great deal of integration and cooperation between DOD and DOS. Recognize these requirements and change DSCA to PSCA with integrated DOD and DOS leadership and structure.
- Change the DISAM focus from FMS to integrated security cooperation programs. As noted above, DSCA's current programs are heavily weighted toward FMS cases. DISAM deals almost exclusively with FMS case management. While FMS is critical, it is just one part of integrated security cooperation programs. DISAM curriculum needs to reflect the spectrum of integrated security cooperation programs and how to plan and implement them. Core curriculum should emphasize an integrated DOS/DOD security cooperation program and portfolio management. Case studies should include building mutually supporting MSPs and CCPs and the program and portfolio required to execute an objective in these plans. Electives should include more detail on FMS case management and other specific activities. Students should tailor DISAM electives based upon the requirements of the Embassy in which they will work. Country team members should

be able to take other DISAM electives on line as the requirements in their partner nation change.

- Charge the new organization with administering joint security cooperation programs. Conduct far more seamless program management between DOS and DOD. Ensure integrated controls are in place and develop the systems required to jointly administer security cooperation programs and funding. Provide executive reports to Congress, DOD, and DOS. Manage authorities and provide joint recommendations to Congress on authorities and funding requirements.
- Implement interagency security cooperation program and portfolio management. Implement the integrated program and portfolio management process shown in figure 12. Create a Joint Investment Board within PSCA and a group of regionally focused portfolio managers who will work with DOD, DOS, and other agencies as required to manage broad portfolios and evaluate their returns on investments. Portfolio managers will provide investment decisions to the Joint Investment Board, which will determine broad investment decisions between regions and specific capability-building programs. It will establish overall investment guidance and review portfolios as appropriate.
- Revise the F process to ensure effective DOS/DOD coordination over security sector Title 22 funding. Modify the current F process to allow greater DOD involvement in the planning and budgeting of Title 22 security sector funds. Ideally, these funds will be planned and budgeted by the Joint Investment Board within a PSCA. When changes occur that require reprogramming to meet new circumstances or requirements, PSCA should assess the security sector impact and make reprogramming recommendations to the Joint Investment Board.

- Create a more robust 1206/1207/1208 program to provide an integrated approach to security sector funding. Expand the funds and authorities available under these programs. Allow DOD to contribute more to these funds. The Joint Investment Board in PSCA should manage the programming and allocation of these funds. Consider placing all security sector Title 22 funds in 1206/1207/1208 as well as the DOD funds.
- Create a systematic approach to security sector program and portfolio management. Develop a system from the national level to the GCC level to manage security cooperation as shown in figure 12. Rather than view each program and authority as separate investments, manage countries and GCCs as investment portfolios. Develop the integrated business processes and investment metrics to evaluate programs at the GCC and national levels in order to make holistic investment decisions that look at all resources required for a program and its expected returns. Form the Joint Investment Boards and other oversight boards at the GCC and national levels to make investment decisions.

### **STANDARDIZE CAPABILITY- AND CAPACITY-BUILDING SYSTEMS.**

- Ensure common business practices across regions. While each GCC has unique requirements that will shape their specific engagements, the overall business practices need to be standardized to ensure a common approach and to readily make priority and resource decisions. Specifically, the program investment worksheets need to be standardized. Other practices, such as assessments and COPs, also are prime candidates for standardization to ensure free flow of information with a common format.

- Ensure common naming and functions across regions. Currently, different GCCs have different naming conventions and functions. While at times the functions may have a common endstate, their processes, names, and organizational design may be quite different. Where possible, common functions and positions should have standardized names, processes, and descriptions. This will help to reduce informational friction throughout the system and provide greater flexibility for mutual support.

### **COMBINE PHASE ZERO AND SSTR INTO A SEAMLESS APPROACH TO SSTR.**

- Develop a common doctrine that supports what is currently called phase zero and SSTR. Combine the approach and organizations that perform phase zero and SSTR functions into a standardized approach to partner capability-building. Develop a common doctrine that combines SSTR and other capability efforts into an integrated approach to partnership building. This combined doctrine will speed SSTR efforts in postconflict situations as well as provide a more standardized approach to all capability-building efforts.
- Create SSTR structures that GCCs can employ during all facets of SSTR activity. Review the current organizations and processes developed for OEF and OIF and develop permanent SSTR organizations that GCCs can employ on an ongoing basis. Each GCC should have a team that can deploy throughout its AOR to conduct joint assessments and manage SSTR and capability-building efforts.

# About the Author

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Brigadier General Jeffery E. Marshall, ARNG (Ret.), was the Deputy Director, Plans and Policy, J5, U.S. European Command, as well as the command's executive liaison to the State Partnership Program. Prior to this assignment, he commanded the Maryland Army National Guard's 29<sup>th</sup> Joint Task Force Augmentation Team and led the unit's deployment to Afghanistan in 2002–2003. While in Afghanistan, BG Marshall was the Director of the Afghan National Army Reconstruction Team that did the original design and building of the Afghan National Army and Border Police. This team also developed the training and mentoring programs and built the initial Afghan National Security Forces barracks, infrastructure, and training facilities. He also commanded the 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Light) brigade as part of Stabilization Force 10 in Bosnia (October 2001–April 2002). BG Marshall is a 1981 graduate of the United States Military Academy.





## **“Skin *in the game*”: Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining Global Security and Stability**

*From the Preface by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN*

[This] book . . . provides a detailed analysis of what we need to do to effectively build and sustain enduring partnerships, examines our current state, and provides a roadmap with specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and employ a holistic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often miss are that our partners have a say in the process and that we need to manage the process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/reinvestment decisions based upon capability objectives that we and our partners agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to achieve them.

